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The Geography of Pre-Criminal Space: Epidemiological 
Imaginations of Radicalisation Risk in the UK Prevent 
Strategy, 2007-2017 
 
Abstract:  This paper explores geographical and epistemological shifts in the deployment of the UK 
Prevent strategy, 2007 - 2017. Counter-radicalisation policies of the Labour governments (2006 – 
2010) focused heavily upon resilience-building activities in residential communities. They borrowed 
from historical models of crime prevention and public health to imagine radicalisation risk as an 
epidemiological concern in areas showing a 2% or higher demography of Muslims. However, this 
racialized and localised imagination of pre-criminal space was replaced, after the election of the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition in 2010. Residential communities were then de-emphasised 
as sites of risk, transmission and pre-criminal intervention. The Prevent Duty now deploys counter-
radicalisation through national networks of education and healthcare provision. Localised models of 
crime prevention (and their statistical, crime prevention epistemologies) have been de-emphasised in 
favour of big data inflected epistemologies of inductive, population-wide ‘safeguarding’. Through the 
biopolitical discourse of ‘safeguarding vulnerable adults’ the Prevent Duty has radically reconstituted 
the epidemiological imagination of pre-criminal space, imagining that all bodies are potentially 
vulnerable to infection by radicalisers and thus warrant surveillance. 
 
Introduction 
In studying the counter-radicalisation practices which constitute the UK’s Prevent strategy, 
academics explore the deployment of pre-crime interventions, targeted disruption, 
rehabilitation, and risk assessment upon individuals and groups (Elshimi 2015; De Goede & 
Simon 2012; Gutowski 2011; Heath-Kelly 2013; Kundnani 2009; Lindekilde 2012). The 
Prevent strategy is, as the name suggests, a series of preventative measures used against 
persons thought to be at higher risk of becoming terrorists, or showing signs of ‘extremism’ 
(understood by the Home Office as the ideological and behavioural precursor to political 
violence). This article traces the imagination of radicalisation risk in UK government policy 
since the rushed emergence of Prevent after the 2005 London bombings. It argues that 
shifts in the Prevent strategy reveal the reconceptualization of pre-crime in British 
counterterrorism.  
Initially, the Prevent pathfinder program of 2007-08 performed pre-criminal intervention in 
the form of community engagement activities and community policing, undertaken by local 
authorities in seventy areas considered high-risk by the Office for Security and 
Counterterrorism (OSCT) (Local Government Association 2008, 2; Thomas 2012). But this 
localised geography of pre-criminal intervention was de-emphasised (not abolished) in 
2010, once the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government took power and 
commissioned the Prevent Review. In the context of their economic austerity agenda, the 
implementation of Prevent through the Department for Communities and Local 
Government ended. Prevent delivery was centralised in the Office for Security and 
Counterterrorism (OSCT), ostensibly to simplify its delivery and reduce the allocation of 
funding for community engagement activities. Labour’s localised imaginations of extremism 
risk in residential communities were then side-lined by the government’s new ‘Prevent 
duty’. This new policy imagines extremism risk nationally, inserting ‘radicalisation 
awareness’ into already existing national structures for safeguarding vulnerable adults1 in 
healthcare and schools.  
In both eras of counter-radicalisation, the prevention of terrorism was understood to 
operate in an explicitly ‘pre-criminal space’ – a phrase that occurs four times in NHS 
England’s Prevent Training and Competencies Framework (Goldberg et al. 2016; NHS 
England 2015). This term is left largely undefined, standing as an empty, but central, 
signifier in the governmental discourse of preventative (yet banal) intervention upon lives 
rendered simultaneously risky and vulnerable-to-becoming-terrorist (Heath-Kelly 2013a). 
But how is pre-criminal space constituted in the imagination of policymakers, and how have 
crime prevention programs been adapted to deliver this form of counterterrorism? 
Pre-criminal measures trace their ancestry to crime prevention measures of the mid-
twentieth century which used data on prior criminal conduct, school drop-outs and 
economic deprivation to model the probability of future offending (McCulloch & Wilson 
2016, 9). An area’s potential to experience crime became predictable and calculable through 
statistical analysis. As I will show in the next section, crime prevention was imagined 
through local geographies, statistical data and the calculative rationality of risk. In the 1990s 
criminal justice embraced the predictive turn, shifting further away from traditional models 
of retrospective intervention by bringing forward the threshold of criminal responsibility. 
Acts undertaken in preparation for criminal offending, or anti-social conduct imagined as 
prelude to future offending, became punishable in-and-of-themselves (Ibid, 9-25).  
The practice of pre-criminal justice as pre-emption develops from these earlier statistically 
oriented models. In the context of the securitisation of crime, and the War on Terror, pre-
crime has since introduced a specifically anticipatory form of policing. In the early 2000’s, US 
& UK police were awarded new powers to pre-emptively detain suspects in 
counterterrorism investigations for significant periods of time. As McCulloch and Wilson 
point out, pre-crimes are crimes which have not happened and are not imminent (Ibid, 25). 
With no crime scene evidence or materials demonstrating preparation for a criminal act, the 
evidence underwriting arrest is replaced by the role of suspicion. If police intelligence places 
a suspect on a nascent trajectory towards terrorist offending, or if one’s travel data or 
financial transactions trigger the digital systems which monitor for flagged behaviours or 
                                                          
1 Safeguarding is the practice of protecting children and adults (with care needs) from financial, physical and 
sexual abuse. The duty to note concerns about abuse and escalate them is incumbent upon school and 
healthcare staff. The Prevent Duty has inserted a new category of abuse, ‘radicalisation’, into safeguarding 
protocol (Home Office 2015b; NHS England 2015). 
deviations from standard patterns (Amoore & De Goede 2005; De Goede 2012), then pre-
emptive intervention can occur.    
The politics of knowledge which construct trajectories of extremism and radicalisation are 
vastly important to the performance of pre-criminal intervention under the Prevent 
Strategy. This article explores how imaginative geographies of extremism risk have changed 
throughout ten years of the Prevent Strategy, outlining the shift from Prevent’s localised 
pre-criminal intervention in residential neighbourhoods to the national rollout of the 
Prevent Duty. The 2015 Prevent Duty invoked a nationalised imagination of pre-criminal 
space. It appropriates national structures of education and healthcare to apply preventative 
surveillance to all citizens, for their own protection (Home Office 2015b). It calls this 
‘safeguarding vulnerable adults’ against terrorism. The Prevent Duty thus securitises all 
bodies as potentially vulnerable to contamination by extremism (even if Muslim and brown 
bodies still make up the majority of referrals made to the police).  
The nationalised imaginary of extremism risk in the Prevent Duty deviates from traditional 
surveillance and profiling - which begins its work by imagining a defined suspect group. Even 
if the Prevent Duty ends up targeting brown bodies, its calculative rationality doesn’t begin 
by imagining them as the location of radicalisation risk. Instead the nationalised Prevent 
Duty replicates a big data logic found in the digital arena – it prioritises the scale of a vast 
sample size, rather than beginning from the suspect community imaginary we have come to 
expect from counterterrorism programs (Hillyard 1993; Pantazis & Pemberton 2009; Ragazzi 
2016). But, because schoolteachers and healthcare professionals are not immune to 
Islamaphobic media discourses, they apply their duties of suspicion unequally and replicate 
the stigmatisation of brown bodies found in Labour’s Prevent Strategy.  
In this way, the performance of pre-crime in Prevent has moved towards algorithmic logics 
of detection and inductive profiling (Heath-Kelly 2016). A calculative shift has occurred 
which imagines pre-criminal space nationally, and Prevent’s deployment has been 
reorganised and extended to fit this landscape. 
 
British Governments and their approaches to Counter-Radicalisation 
The Prevent agenda was first invented by Tony Blair’s government in 2006. It was the first 
example of a counter-radicalisation strategy in Europe or America. It was pre-existed by the 
de-radicalisation interventions of the Saudi Arabian regime which has, since 2004, 
attempted to un-teach ‘deviant’ interpretations of Islam through religious re-education in 
prisons (Boucek 2008). Yet Saudi Arabia’s rehabilitation of prison populations is an example 
of criminal prevention, rather than pre-crime intervention; it relies on statistical data about 
offending rates to predict future crime risk (McCulloch & Wilson 2016). It utilises the 
statistical calculative rationality of crime prevention. This makes the UK’s counter-
radicalisation strategy the first to take on an explicitly pre-crime formulation of prevention 
(as opposed to statistically targeted rehabilitation measures). Without the use of statistical 
data on offending rates, Blair’s Prevent strategy imagined a pre-criminal space within British 
Asian residential areas where extremism risk necessitated intervention.  
The originality of the Prevent Strategy must be understood within the context of the London 
bombings of 2005 and the failed tube bombing which immediately followed. The 
government was thrown into a panicked search for methods to prevent suicide bombers 
who, unlike previous generations of militants, possessed few links to established 
organisations. Traditional surveillance, suppression and infiltration techniques from the 
campaign against the IRA could not be replicated. In this knowledge and policy vacuum, the 
discourse of radicalisation emerged to explain the seemingly individualised and 
disconnected pathways of citizens into armed militancy (Heath-Kelly 2013a; Kirby 2007; 
Sageman 2004; Sedgwick 2010). In response to this new discourse of decentralised threat, 
Blair’s government introduced the Prevent strategy as an anticipatory program of counter-
radicalisation, deployed by local authorities to identify and counter extremist influences. 
Early Prevent documentation explicitly framed counter-radicalisation as deploying 
community cohesion and moderate Islam against extremist influences, to bring about 
preventative effects through community resilience: 
It is not for government to intervene in theological debates, but there is a role for 
government in […] providing effective campaigns to confront extremist ideologies; 
promoting local role models able to counter negative imagery and comment; promoting 
understanding of the benefits that Muslims have brought to local areas; promoting 
understanding and acceptance of key shared values, and promoting dialogue and 
engagement between communities in support of those values (Department for Communities 
and Local Government 2007, 5). 
The Department for Communities and Local Government oversaw the initial Prevent 
‘pathfinder’ pilot of 2007/8, which targeted intelligence gathering and community 
engagement activities at seventy local communities mapped as high-risk for producing 
extremists (Department of Communities and Local Government 2007). Please see Appendix 
A for the seventy priority areas defined by central government as high risk in 2007. The 
demographic make-up of areas funded by the Prevent Pathfinder program in 2008-9 
suggests that their ‘extremism risk’ and level of funding was directly constituted in relation 
to their numbers of Muslim residents (Kundnani 2009, 13-4). 
As I will show in the next sections,  early Prevent operations under Labour governments 
redeployed the rationales of public health and criminal prevention models from the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Here, communities were profiled as sites for health and 
policing interventions according to their statistically generated risk score for vulnerability to 
diseases or crime. The public health and pre-crime typologies of primary, secondary and 
tertiary preventative interventions were directly carried over into Labour’s Prevent strategy, 
constituting a heat-map of vulnerability to extremism based upon community 
demographics. 
However, this didn’t last. Under the Coalition and subsequent Conservative governments,  
the apparatus and operations of counter-radicalisation have shifted. While capacity-building 
within communities and community policing still occurs, Prevent planning and 
implementation has been considerably centralised in the Home Office since 2010. Local 
authorities have been cut out, now existing only as bidders for Home Office created Prevent 
activities and funds for their implementation. Furthermore, the new Prevent safeguarding 
duty2 is not applied exclusively to/through British Asian residential communities but through 
the national systems of education and healthcare.  
Of particular interest here is the 2011 Prevent Review undertaken by the Coalition 
government. The Coalition took office in 2010, after thirteen years of Labour Party 
governments. Labour had previously implemented the Prevent Strategy through the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), relying upon methods and 
assemblages previously used to deploy ‘community cohesion’ (interventions designed to 
effect cross-community reduction of tensions) (Thomas 2012; 2014). The administrative 
geography of Prevent under Labour was heavily associated with local authority delivery of 
workshops and events that promoted ‘moderate Islam’ in residential communities; prevent 
governed through community, if you will. 
The Coalition introduced a raft of austerity measures to reduce public spending, including 
the severing of Prevent’s delivery through the DCLG – removing the link to integration work 
and ownership of Prevent work by local authorities. The Prevent review centralised control 
of Prevent delivery within the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) (Thomas 
2014). Indeed, it de-emphasised ‘community’ as the landscape for counterterrorism and 
moved Prevent towards administration through whole-of-population institutions (schools, 
universities and healthcare premises). While ‘community’ has not totally disappeared as the 
mechanism through which Prevent is delivered and articulated, and local variations exist in 
Prevent-funded community development (O’Toole et al. 2016), residential community has 
been deemphasised in favour of nationalised imaginations of terrorism risk and pre-criminal 
intervention. 
As I will show, this is unusual. Prevent now embeds the reporting of deviance in national 
organisations because they have a high level of public contact. It defends this massively 
increased surveillance of the population by arguing that larger sample size is beneficial to 
counterterrorism. This logic is alien to crime prevention models which used statistical data 
to allocate risk scores to discrete areas. As such, post-2011 Prevent reflects an epistemology 
more common to big data and algorithmic tools.  
                                                          
2 In 2015, it became a legal duty for healthcare providers, schools and universities to take part in the 
suppression of ‘radicalisation’ and report subjects of concern to the police. In schools and healthcare, this is 
framed as a safeguarding duty performed for the benefit of the subject concerned. 
Digital methods and epistemologies prioritise the collection of huge datasets and utilise 
computerised techniques to partition and reassemble the data scraps. Rather than reducing 
sample size and narrowing down onto suspect groups, the epistemology behind complexity 
science invokes the potential within huge data sets. The human eye cannot detect patterns 
at this scale, but complexity epistemology advocates that machines can identify correlations 
which have previously remained hidden (Amoore & Piotukh 2016). While the Prevent 
strategy does not utilise algorithms as such, the reworking of its administration and 
deployment suggests an influence of big data epistemological discourse on planners and 
policymakers (Heath-Kelly 2016) – one which has played a role in Prevent’s shifting 
geography of pre-crime. 
While the epistemological and geographical imagination of extremism risk within Prevent is 
shifting towards nationalisation, I do not want to suggest that all ethnicities are equally 
made suspect by Prevent as a result. This article does not claim that white British and British 
Asians find themselves equally exposed to suspicion or intervention. Rather it models the 
shift towards whole-of-population subjection to, and mass responsibilisation for, the 
Prevent Strategy. Prevent no longer begins from the assumption that pre-criminal 
interventions should target particular residential areas, even if its nationalisation still 
disproportionately stigmatises and affects British Muslims. An epistemological and 
geographical shift has occurred in the imagination and pre-emptive mapping of extremism 
risk. 
 
An Epidemiology of Radicalisation under Labour 
Pre-crime interventions have a long history. They did not begin as counterterrorism tactics, 
but have historically taken the form of crime reduction initiatives deployed upon ‘high-risk’ 
areas and cases. And these crime reduction initiatives themselves rely upon prior discourses 
and methods of public health and preventative medicine. Antecedent public health 
strategies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries produced geographical epidemiologies 
of threats to population health such as cholera. Importantly, these public health 
geographies utilised a tripartite frame to categorise the population, one which was directly 
carried over into pre-crime interventions and counter-radicalisation (of the New Labour era, 
1997-2010). 
At the ‘primary’ level, preventative public health measures target the health of the general 
population vis-à-vis a threat or contaminant (rather than the sick, or a group thought highly 
likely to become sick). The general conditions which enable disease are the object of 
intervention. For example, a ‘primary’ measure includes the introduction of a sewer system 
to manage human waste, thereby acting at the level of the entire population to prevent 
illness. ‘Secondary’ preventative measures are localised interventions performed upon 
individuals and groups showing early symptoms of disease, or at high likelihood of 
contracting illness. This is a more focused intervention aimed at prevention contagion 
within particular communities. Finally, ‘tertiary’ prevention is directed towards those 
already suffering from a disease – to cure them, rehabilitate them, and prevent 
reoccurrence (Brantingham & Faust 1976; van Dijk & de Waard 1991).  
This public health geography of prevention is thus constituted around notions of proximity 
and contagion. Those already sick are found at the centre, whereas secondary health 
interventions pre-emptively target those deemed to be in proximity to contagions, and 
primary interventions intervene upon general enabling conditions at the level of the 
population. 
These public heath typologies were directly transplanted from epidemiology to crime 
prevention efforts of the mid twentieth century. Crime became something statistically 
predictable, inherently geographic and preventable in policy-terms. As in public health, the 
primary level of crime prevention identified the general conditions that enable crime to 
occur. Primary crime prevention measures were then applied to the general population – 
whether or not they were deemed likely to become criminals or victims of crime - 
introducing neighbourhood watch policies and televised crime awareness campaigns (van 
Dijk & de Waard 1991). The lacking awareness of crime in the broader population was here 
constituted as an enabling condition of crime.  
The secondary level of crime prevention engaged in the early identification of potential 
criminals. It generated pre-crime demographics from statistical modelling of population 
data. Geographies of future offenders were produced from school drop-out figures, the 
locations of pockets of economically disadvantaged and untrained youths, and sometimes 
even the presence of citizens with physical and mental disabilities (Brantingham & Faust 
1976). This particularly offensive symptomology is drawn from 1960s crime prevention 
initiatives in the United States, but all secondary crime prevention produces knowledge by 
analysing the statistical correlates of crime (school exclusion, economic disadvantage) and 
then reversing the analytic temporality - to assume that the correlative symptom increases 
the probability of crime. This generates a risk score. 
In such correlative analysis an epidemiological geography of crime was created – a map of 
supposed pre-crime areas and demographics. These spaces were then targeted with job 
training, education interventions and social activities which supposedly promoted resilience 
and civic responsibility.  
Finally, tertiary prevention was transplanted from the already-diseased of public health to 
the convicted offenders of criminal justice. Even this tertiary level was considered 
preventative (rather than simply punitive), because the judicial response to crime aimed at 
the reduction of recidivism through the separation of offenders from the population 
(imprisonment), rehabilitation programs and treatment programs for addiction (van Dijk & 
de Waard 1991). 
The three levels of  constitute a geographical model of offending risk and criminal 
prevention through statistics. The calculative rationality underpinning public health 
interventions and ‘criminal prevention’ is the statistical paradigm which emerged in the 
nineteenth century. This model replaced Enlightenment faith in human nature, natural law 
and determinative causality (Hacking 1990). In the statistical paradigm, probabilities are 
used to calculate the chance of future disorder or illness and then to direct appropriate 
political interventions. Probability science involves abstracting from the individual case to 
the level of all cases. Through the collection of crime figures, poverty statistics and school-
leaving data, base rates of statistical probability (‘regularities’ within a large population) can 
be produced. This produces knowledge about likely futures. This knowledge production is 
simultaneously a mapping exercise – creating a geographical model of risk and pre-criminal 
intervention. 
The same epidemiological typology of prevention can be directly mapped onto the early 
years (2007-2011) of the UK Prevent Strategy. Under the Labour governments of the early 
twenty-first century, counter-terrorism prevention was (hurriedly) deployed through the 
geography of primary, secondary and tertiary interventions, constituting  an imagined, 
epidemiological geography of extremism risk.  
One of the first official steps in terrorism prevention involved the increased 
responsibilisation of the general public for preventing terrorism. In the style of primary pre-
crime interventions upon the general ‘enabling conditions’ of crime, the public were tasked 
with reporting suspect packages and behaviour to the police through public awareness 
campaigns. Posters and tannoy announcements adorned the walls and filled the concourses 
of public transport networks, instructing citizens to report any suspicious activity or 
packages to the British Transport Police. Jon Coaffee and Peter Rogers have described this 
as the post September 11 intensification of previous emergency planning doctrines, where 
individual citizens are now called upon to play a role in urban risk management (Coaffee & 
Rogers 2007). Coaffee’s work also points to governmental perception that openness, as a 
condition of unfettered movement within cities, enables terrorism to occur. In this 
geographical reading of threat mobility, governments turn to material objects like ‘rings of 
steel’, bollards and cordons to protect financial districts and parliaments (Coaffee 2004).  
In this conceptualisation of primary level terrorism prevention, the general conditions which 
enable crime to occur are the non-suspicious attitude of the population and the relative 
openness of the urban environment. To combat the threat of terrorism, both population 
and urban infrastructure are adapted to disrupt the malicious intents of deviants. These 
primary level preventative measures were also used by the British Government with regards 
to the IRA campaign. 
After these primary level interventions in the domestic arena failed to prevent the London 
bombings of 2005, the British government adopted the secondary and tertiary levels of pre-
crime intervention – making their innovative leap into pre-crime. Policymakers and media 
constituted the ‘radicalisation’ discourse to explain how, and why, British nationals would 
bomb London. The discourse relies upon the imagination of a (disruptable) socialisation 
process of peer-pressure and ideological change which leads to terrorism – a model very 
different to previous research in Terrorism Studies on protest movements and root causes3. 
The individualised discourse of radicalisation emerged immediately after the London 
bombings (Kundnani 2015; Sedgwick 2010) and imagined the process by which British 
citizens could turn against their own government, under the influence of ‘extremist 
ideology’ and disenfranchisement.  
Counter-radicalisation interventions were aligned with the secondary level of prevention 
under the Labour governments: they mapped those considered likely to develop symptoms 
of terrorism. But what statistical data could be used to model the chance of terrorists 
emerging in a given area? Unlike public health interventions, imaginative geographies of 
radicalisation risk struggle to generate predictive statistical models. As Mark Sageman 
(2016) has convincingly argued, cases of terrorism are too few and far between to construct 
the base rate upon which a statistical model relies. Unlike the predictive modelling of 
burglary and street crime, there are not enough terrorists to produce statistical models of 
terrorism and allocate risk scores to areas. In this vacuum, residential demographics 
substituted for the statistical base rate of previous crime prevention models.  
In 2007, Prevent funding was provided to seventy local authorities in relation to the 
numbers of Muslims in their area. If an area had been 5% comprised of Muslims in the 2001 
census data, or more, then it qualified for the new Prevent funds (Thomas 2014). This 
threshold was later reduced to 2%, according to Paul Thomas (Ibid). This funding-according-
to-demographic clearly demonstrates the reductive and offensive association of Muslims 
and British Asian communities with extremism potential by central government. The 
number of Muslims was understood as a precursor to terrorism by the government, given 
the stated faith of the 9/11 hijackers and the 7/7 London bombers. The demographic of 
residential communities became constituted as the secondary level of intervention – the ‘at-
risk’ population requiring preventative intervention.  
Prevent funding from central government was used to fund a wide variety of social and 
training activities for British Asian residential communities, including language courses, 
training in accessing local services, sports, and cross-community work – operating in parallel 
with assemblages of ‘community cohesion’ (Kundnani 2009; Thomas 2010). Policies of 
‘community cohesion’ had been introduced after riots in British Asian areas of Northern 
cities in the summer of 2001. Despite these riots being provoked by white nationalist 
agitators, the Cantle report on the disturbances advocated preventative measures which 
would (among other things) reduce community self-segregation. To build cross-community 
                                                          
3 In the decades prior to 9/11, much terrorism research was concerned with the root structural causes of 
terrorism, or locating the connections between protest cycles and violent offshoot groups, or mapping the 
pathological mindset which enables terrorist crimes. 
engagement, community cohesion policies funded local ‘shared events’, as well as ‘arrival 
packs’ for new residents (Kundnani 2009; Worley 2005). The distribution of Prevent funding 
to local authorities according to population demographics, to projects mirroring community 
cohesion assemblages, saw the creation of a Prevent geography where race (even if not 
mentioned by name) constituted the key condition for potential contagion. Prevent mapped 
British Asian communities as being ‘at risk of becoming risky’ (Heath-Kelly 2013) in the style 
of public health interventions on communities thought likely to become sick. Prevent then 
deployed local organisations to build resilience to extremism in these areas and trained 
favoured ‘moderate’ figures to this end.  
The original ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ documentation was reasonably open about the 
government’s perception of British Asian communities as spaces of ideological conflict and 
vulnerability, advocating the promotion of moderate voices against extremist narratives 
(Department for Communities and Local Government 2007). The funding of educational and 
social activities through a counterterrorism remit was intended to build the ‘resilience’ of 
these communities to violent extremism – increasing their resistance to problematic 
ideologies and enabling them to challenge extremist viewpoints (Home Office 2009).  
The language of resilience as resistance to extremist ideologies directly parallels the 
language of contagions and the fostering of immunity. Unlike community cohesion work, 
however, voluntary organisations and local authority staff working with Prevent money 
soon became uncomfortable with the expectation to pass information about communities 
and individuals to the police (as well as the embedding of counterterrorism officers in 
service delivery). The national government’s initial attempt to fund community cohesion 
work and Prevent work in equal measure steadily gave way to the dominance of securitizing 
actors and perspectives at both local and national levels (Thomas 2014). In Birmingham, for 
example, the introduction of Prevent saw a leading Counterterrorism Unit (CTU) officer 
transplanted into the Council Equalities Division to manage the project funding – causing 
great alarm about the implicit surveillance of communities being undertaken (O’Toole et al. 
2016). In the interaction between national and local governments, the Home Office applied 
pressure upon local authorities to adopt Prevent reporting measures (national indicator 35) 
and tip their practice towards monitoring British Asian communities rather than community 
cohesion activities (Thomas 2010). 
The congruence of surveillance with the funding of community events should not surprise 
us, once we note the translation of the tripartite model of criminal and epidemiological 
prevention. Once communities are mapped as locations of secondary contagion likely to 
develop symptoms, even well intentioned activities dedicated to capacity-building and 
resilience are situated within the securitised prevention of deviance. Underneath the 
ambiguous language of ‘community’ and the fluffy funding of sports, lurked a very real 
governance agenda of secondary crime prevention designed to intervene upon those 
considered likely to develop symptoms of radicalisation. Surveillance is the obvious 
counterpart to community integration in this model. 
In the Labour era, one might describe Prevent’s ‘secondary level interventions’ as the 
meeting point between ‘community cohesion’ (which promoted integration and cross-
community relations through voluntary organisations), and ‘community policing’. Both 
operate at the secondary level of crime prevention, targeting those groups who have been 
designated as vulnerable to future disorder through statistical modelling exercises. 
Community policing is an approach to law enforcement which maximises collaboration with 
local residents, responding to neighbourhood grievances in exchange for the facilitation of 
flows of information about crime. It constitutes areas of pre-crime through statistical 
modelling, then embeds officers in the community to reduce the threat of potential 
deviance. This type of policing originally had roots in the prosecution of neighbourhood 
crimes but was adapted to counterterrorism in post-7/7 Britain (Klausen 2009). As Klausen 
argues, policymakers favoured bolstering the relationship between British-Asian 
communities and police to both improve the potential flow of counterterrorist intelligence, 
and also to mitigate any damage resulting from operations and arrests. 
Such national policy on counterterrorism had the effect of constituting Muslim 
neighbourhoods as both ‘stakeholders’ in, and suspects of, the Prevent agenda. They were 
implicitly portrayed as both at-risk (and deserving of additional resourcing and support) and 
risky (to be surveilled as potential threats) (Heath-Kelly 2013). Furthermore this command 
that communities engage with the state, via their local police, produced binary identities 
within communities on the basis of co-operation. As Basia Spalek and Alia Imtoual argue, 
community engagement practices produced binaries of legitimate/illegitimate, 
moderate/radical Muslims (Spalek & Imtoual 2007). The early geography of Prevent thus 
constituted British Asian residential neighbourhoods as locations of secondary intervention 
on its heat map of pre-crime (see Kundnani 2009 & Appendix A), before allocating privileged 
status to certain members of those neighbourhoods though their collaboration with 
prevention endeavours.  
These dynamics speak to the second meaning of ‘community policing’, alluded to in recent 
work by Francesco Ragazzi as ‘policed multiculturalism’, whereby the policy performatively 
enacts and constitutes the ‘community’ it names (Ragazzi 2015). Here, counterterrorism 
officers police the boundaries of the community through designations of who, and who 
does not, count as a relevant stakeholder. Simultaneously, however, community 
engagement is also a productive deployment of power; members of ‘engaged’ communities 
self-nominate to take on roles in the adjudication and monitoring of conduct, as well as the 
promotion of a self-defined ‘moderate’ Islam (Ragazzi 2016).  
This perspective is an important corrective to the ‘suspect community’ thesis which 
highlights the legal and cultural assemblages which constitute ethnic groups as potentially 
dangerous, and subject to exceptional treatment (Breen-Smyth 2014; Hickman et al. 2011; 
Hillyard 1993). As Ragazzi, Spalek & Imtoual, and other scholars show, the constitution of a 
community as suspicious is not simply a disciplinary action performed from outside; rather, 
collusory conduct is also induced from community members who are awarded privileged 
status in exchange for cooperation. But whatever the specificities of counterterrorism 
dynamics in communities rendered suspect, there can be little doubt that Prevent’s early 
geography conforms to a secondary level pre-crime model. Communities identified as more 
vulnerable to becoming deviant were made subject to pre-crime interventions of capacity 
building, integration workshops and surveillance (Kundnani 2009). The epidemiological 
model fits. 
Finally, the tertiary level of British counterterrorism under Labour acted upon those already 
made ‘radical’. To refer back to the original conceptualisation of tertiary crime prevention, it 
intervenes upon convicted offenders to reduce their reoffending risk through long-term 
incarceration and/or rehabilitation (Brantingham & Faust 1976). In a further study of the 
translation of public health models to crime prevention, van Dijk & De Waard confirmed 
that tertiary crime prevention acts upon offenders and ex-offenders through rehabilitation 
and treatment programs (van Dijk & De Waard 1991). This tertiary level of crime prevention 
also maps onto the Saudi deployment of theological corrections upon prisoners, to prevent 
future offending. 
In Brantingham and Faust’s terms, the tertiary dimensions of British counterterrorism under 
the Labour governments were demonstrated in the open-ended detention of terrorism 
suspects under control orders and TPIMs4. These house-arrest programs were efforts to 
prevent potential deviance through immobility. Their geography is largely a secret one. The 
artist Edmund Clark recently exhibited his work ‘Control Order House’ at London’s Imperial 
War Museum, speaking directly to the proliferation of secretive residential detention (Clark 
2013). Clark’s photographic exhibition explores the mundane, stripped bare existence of the 
residence under indefinite legal curfew. It conveys the silent worlds of such detention which 
exist secretly alongside us, in every town and city, mapped by the Home Office and Police 
but unknown to the population. 
Other tertiary measures also existed and continue to exist. The Channel program of multi-
agency rehabilitation interventions for those showing signs of extremism has a similar 
tertiary geography of secrecy; like control order houses, its presence is ever-present yet 
unseen by the public. The Association of Chief Police Officers maintains organisational 
control over Channel – which is described as a multiagency collaboration between local 
authorities, educational partners, health services partners, social services, children’s 
services, police and offender management partners to ‘divert people away from the risk 
they face before illegality occurs’ (Home Office 2012, 4). It is a de-radicalisation program 
present in every local authority, focusing on the rehabilitation of those thought to be on the 
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enforce a curfew upon a suspect and limit their use of phones and internet. 
path towards terrorism through mentoring and counselling by an approved community 
peer. 
But, unlike normal criminal rehabilitation of offenders, counterterrorism has brought 
tertiary prevention forward in time: into the pre-terrorist stage. Convicted terrorists are not 
made subject to Channel (they are imprisoned); rather, it is those categorised as moving 
towards violent extremism who are subjected to Channel interventions. This premature 
deployment of rehabilitation upon the potential offender speaks to the underlying temporal 
confusion of the radicalisation discourse: knowledge cannot identify the tipping point when 
illiberal thought and behaviour produces terrorism. In this grey-zone, Prevent 
performatively constitutes a new category of offender (Heath-Kelly 2013; Sageman 2016) – 
the pre-criminal ‘terrorist’ requiring rehabilitation before they commit a crime. The 
epidemiology of radicalisation risk introduces the treatment stage before crime, or even 
criminal preparation, has occurred. The imagination of pre-criminal states brings forward 
the threshold of deviancy and intervention, enabling the ‘rehabilitation’ of persons reported 
to police by community leaders for holding political or religious views deemed suspicious. 
To conclude, under post-9/11 Labour governments the deployment of pre-criminal 
interventions largely followed the tripartite structure of previous criminal and public health 
models of prevention – albeit, with racialisation replacing the statistical knowledge which 
underwrote previous eras of criminal prevention. Separate measures were deployed at each 
‘level’ of intervention: public information campaigns at the primary level of the general 
populous; community workshops and community policing at the secondary level of 
residential communities deemed vulnerable; and preventative-rehabilitation deployed upon 
those considered already affected by radical contagion at the tertiary level. The Labour 
governments translated criminal prevention and community cohesion models into 
counterterrorism, but reworked them around a different calculative rationality: statistical 
prediction was replaced by the imagination of pre-criminal space and epidemiological 
vulnerability attached to race. This endorsement of pre-emption and pre-crime was to 
become even more pronounced in the subsequent Coalition and Conservative eras. 
 
Nationalising Pre-Criminal Space: Prevent under the Conservatives 
Since the election of the Coalition government of 2010, the geographical application and the 
epistemology of the Prevent strategy has changed. Upon election in May 2010, all secondary 
level Prevent work was immediately suspended pending the Prevent Review of 20115. This 
official review explored Labour’s counter-radicalisation structures then permanently 
removed responsibilities for the Prevent Strategy from the Department of Communities and 
Local Government (DCLG) and instead passed them to the Home Office under the Office for 
Security and Counterterrorism (OSCT). The Coalition Government decided that previous 
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Labour administrations had muddled the delivery of two separate areas of policy: 
community integration and counterterrorism (Home Office 2011, 1). This can be interpreted 
as a direct criticism of Prevent’s secondary level of crime prevention. The Coalition and 
Conservative governments’ geography of counterterrorism has largely de-operationalised 
residential communities in the delivery of Prevent, removing the DCLG from operations and 
reducing the number of local authorities funded to deliver Prevent activities from seventy to 
twenty eight. 
Alongside the continuation of limited community engagement activities, Prevent is now 
deployed through RICU messaging from the OSCT and through whole-of-population 
institutions of healthcare and education. The Prevent Duty (the legal duty to report 
suspicions of radicalisation) has operated in all schools, healthcare premises and universities 
since at least 2015, but in priority areas since 2011.  
This has split the administration of the Prevent Strategy between localised community 
focused engagement (which works from an assumption about suspicious locales and 
identities) and the national level (which acts upon the whole of population). To some 
degree, particularly ethnicities are still imagined as pre-criminal and epidemiologically 
vulnerable, despite the wider rollout of Prevent surveillance to all citizens. For example, 
RICU messaging has been deliberately targeted at particular ethnicities and age ranges 
through to be higher risk for extremism. The Research Information and Communications 
Unit (RICU) of the Home Office, was founded in 2007 and led by Commander Steve Tatham, 
previously responsible for psychological operations at the Ministry of Defence (Sabir 2017). 
After undertaking research projects on British Muslim communities and online habits, Sabir 
describes how the unit began deploying covert anti-radicalisation messaging towards young 
males of Pakistani, Bengali and Somali ethnicity. This messaging was delivered covertly by 
employing several PR firms (Breakthrough Media Network; Bell Pottinger) to disseminate 
the unit’s propaganda – obscuring the source.  
Given the ethnic profiling undertaken by RICU, we can clearly see that the secondary level of 
pre-crime intervention has not been discarded altogether. Racial profiling still informs the 
delivery of preventative interventions and the supposed building of ‘resilience’ to 
extremism. Furthermore, a reduced number of local authorities (seventy reduced to twenty-
eight) still receive some central government funding to deliver Prevent interventions and 
capacity building upon their populations (Thomas 2014). The government advises that 
intelligence agencies and police have identified these twenty-eight areas as ‘hot spots’ of 
the greatest vulnerability, but publicly available maps of their location are unavailable. We 
can, however, assume that the twenty-eight hot spots are drawn from the seventy areas 
listed as high risk for extremism in 2007 though (Appendix A).  
Both the materials and funding for Prevent work are now drawn from central government 
sources, with local authorities effectively being paid to deliver Home Office content with 
little agency. A recent leak of Home Office documents regarding Prevent activities 
conducted in 2015 confirms this reading (Home Office 2015a). It shows that the central 
government funded local authorities and outreach organisations to deliver centrally-
produced content, including: school plays about a Muslim Imam deployed with the British 
Army, the training of Muslim women in countering extremist rhetoric, and videos shown in 
schools and youth centres about boys who make bad choices and join jihadist or far right 
organisations. The twenty-eight local authorities were used like local franchises for the 
delivery of the Home Office’s message. 
The delivery of government workshops by youth workers and civil servants, within areas 
designated high-risk areas requiring secondary-level intervention, speaks to Francesco 
Ragazzi’s research on the securitisation of social policy in Western Europe during the War on 
Terror (Ragazzi 2017). In the delivery of these secondary interventions, and the tertiary 
performance of ‘rehabilitation’ upon the radicalised by multi-agency panels (the Channel 
program), we can recognise Ragazzi’s argument that social policy has been securitised. The 
securitising move relies upon the historical trust placed in social care professionals by 
populations, which is then used to introduce counterterrorism policing and surveillance-
masked-as-social-care into suspect residential communities. 
However, the model of securitised social work captures the Labour government’s Prevent 
Strategy better than it does the Conservative. While the post-2011 Prevent arena still 
deploys some elements of secondary level intervention (identifying twenty-eight high 
priority local areas for Home Office produced content, targeting particular ethnicities with 
RICU messaging) the remainder of the policy operates according to a different 
epistemological logic. Through the Prevent Duty, the secondary level of epidemiology 
(vulnerability to infection) has become blurred with the primary (the generalised conditions 
which enable the spread of disease within human populations).  
The major development in the Conservative government’s Prevent Strategy has been the 
2015 Prevent Duty (Home Office 2015b). This Duty has legally enforced a requirement on all 
schools, nurseries, healthcare premises and universities to have ‘due regard’ for preventing 
terrorism. All schools must be aware of radicalisation risks, report signs of radicalisation to 
their police contact, and teach ‘British values’ to the children. Healthcare premises are also 
required to roll out Prevent training to all staff with safeguarding duties and to report signs 
of radicalisation to their police contact. The Prevent Duty Guidance specifies that: 
‘Safeguarding’ is the process of protecting vulnerable people, whether from crime, other 
forms of abuse or (in the context of this document) from being drawn into terrorist related 
activity (Home Office 2015b, 21). 
In one discursive move, protecting vulnerable adults from abuse has been merged with 
nationwide counterterrorism monitoring. This biopolitical imagination of pre-criminal space 
constitutes vulnerable bodies as potential terrorists. We are all now ‘vulnerable bodies’ 
though because one’s status as vulnerable is defined circularly by one’s adoption of extreme 
views. One must already have been vulnerable, prior to being flagged as a potential radical; 
otherwise such pathological views could not have developed. As such, the deployment of 
the counter-radicalisation through the Prevent Duty blurs the primary and secondary levels 
of criminal prevention/public health intervention. Every community is vulnerable to 
extremist infection and criminal proclivity; the general epidemiological enabling condition is 
reworked as human existence itself. 
At the moment, universities have lighter responsibilities under the 2015 Prevent Duty 
(Home Office 2015b) and are not required to train academic staff in the detection and 
reporting of radicalisation (although some choose to rollout the Government’s WRAP 
training). In the view of my own institution, each university is required to perform a 
radicalisation risk assessment, put structures in place to deal with any reports of 
radicalisation, have an external speaker vetting process, and to give government Prevent 
training only to ‘key’ members of staff (usually interpreted as the student residences, 
counselling and security teams). The Prevent Duty thus lurks in the background of student-
institutional interaction, unlike its overt deployment within schools and healthcare 
premises. 
By July 2016, the Home Office confirmed that 550,000 doctors, nurses and teachers had 
received Prevent WRAP6 training (Jeory & Cockburn 2016). The number of social sector 
professionals given responsibility for counterterrorism continues to rise with the prolonged 
roll out of Prevent training - and one could make the argument that social policy has indeed 
been further securitised. However, in making that argument, one also needs to account for 
the geographical shift in the implementation of the Prevent strategy. The vast network of 
doctors, nurses, lecturers and teachers now incorporated into counterterrorism reporting 
are not service providers only to the ethnicities and residential communities made suspect 
in Labour’s era. They aren’t only implementing their training upon designated high-risk 
groups; rather the mechanics of the Prevent Duty are present in the social services provided 
to the whole-of-population. 
Of course, Muslims are still constructed as a suspect community by Islamaphobic media 
reporting and government statements (such as David Cameron’s ‘muscular liberalism’ 
address of 2011). However, the developments of Conservative Prevent policy appear to be 
de-emphasising residential communities as a starting point for pre-criminal intervention, in 
favour of national Prevent delivery through social service providers. Prevent’s geographical 
application has changed, merging the previously distinct categories of primary and 
secondary implementation. 
The Prevent Duty also represents a dramatic epistemological shift away from statistical 
calculative methods. Statistical models of crime prevention could never support such a 
whole-of-population roll out, because actuarial rationalities subtract from general 
                                                          
6 Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent 
population data to identify specific locations of probable threat. Instead of isolating 
particular areas of contagion and intervention, the Prevent duty now prioritises the 
responsibilities of national social care facilities for counterterrorism surveillance. This has 
had the effect of massively increasing the number of referrals made to Channel. Police and 
local authorities encounter a far larger amount of data about extremism as a result of this 
geographical expansion. For example, the number of referrals made to the Channel de-
radicalisation program has skyrocketed since the introduction of the Prevent Duty. For 
example, between 1st January and 31st December 2015, 3955 people were reported to 
Channel – a massive increase on previous years, up 209% from the referral of 1281 people in 
2014. The 3955 referrals in 2015 is more even than the sum of 3943 referrals made in the 
preceding eight years (NPCC undated)!  
These dramatic increases were the result, and apparently the intention, of the new Prevent 
geography. Indeed, the revised Prevent strategy describes schools and clinics as potential 
assets for counterterrorism because of their huge numbers of contacts with the population: 
1.3 million NHS workers have contact with over 315,000 patients daily and some 700,000 
workers in private and voluntary healthcare organisations see many thousands more [...] 
Given the very high numbers of people who come into contact with health professionals in 
this country, the sector is a critical partner in Prevent. There are clearly many opportunities 
for doctors, nurses and other staff to help protect people from radicalisation. The key 
challenge is to ensure that healthcare workers can identify the signs that someone is 
vulnerable to radicalisation, interpret those signs correctly and access the relevant support 
(Home Office 2011, 83-5).   
This prioritisation of scale is indicative of a move from actuarial (statistical) modelling 
towards an algorithmic or big data rationality. As such, the geographical shift in Prevent is 
also an epistemological one. In the digital realm of inductive calculation, data is not used to 
calculate probability. Induction works according to different logics to produce imaginations 
of risk. Louise Amoore’s work on the UK e-borders program has been pivotal in exploring 
algorithmic security calculation, showing how digital analytics combine discrete and 
unrelated pieces of data (like travel histories and methods of payment) to constitute 
possible futures of risk or normality (Amoore 2011). These data ‘scraps’ generate patterns 
and correlations. The mode of inductive calculation associated with algorithmic prediction 
involves the ingestion, partitioning and machinic reassembly of vast amounts of data – 
transforming them into knowledge ‘spoken’ into being by the algorithmic process (Amoore 
& Piotukh 2015). Complexity becomes the modality of calculation, because it is presumed 
that such heterogeneity (on such a vast scale) has the potential to reveal new patterns and 
connections between previously disparate factors (Comfort et al. 2010; Heath-Kelly 2016). 
Despite the usual restriction of algorithmic rationalities to the digital realm, there are 
reasons to believe that big data discourse has informed the geographical shift in Prevent 
strategy interventions, within the context of the Conservative austerity drive. First, the 
deployment of Prevent through the entire social services network renders the whole-of-
population as an object of surveillance, despite no fears that the entire British population is 
about to rebel. Scale has been prioritised, and referral numbers have rocketed. Scale has 
become a modality of pre-crime intervention.  
Second, the training given to social professionals does not train them to recognise a static 
risk profile of radicalisation symptoms. As I have shown elsewhere, the training is confused, 
vague and does not provide a profile of the radicalised subject (Heath-Kelly 2016). Indeed 
NHS policy on Prevent emphasizes that a static risk profile would not capture the nebulous 
and shifting character of radicalisation and thus staff must instead use their ‘professional 
judgement’ to detect terrorists (NHS England 2015). This is interesting because it suggests 
the adoption of an inductive modality common to big data epistemologies. Here, prevent 
surveillance is understood to generate the terrorist profile rather than responding to it. 
Through prolific contacts with the public, social professionals are thought able to distinguish 
the radical from the normal. In this paradigm, their embeddedness in vast flows of contact 
(data) renders them as potential counter-terrorism assets, capable of organically noticing 
the future radical (despite a constantly shifting profile) and alerting the police. 
The geographical shift in Prevent is thus accompanied by altered epistemological 
commitments. The prioritisation of scale, and the refusal to limit the remit of Prevent to the 
reporting of defined symptoms, indicates a non-actuarial calculative rationality. Vast 
swathes of social workers are expected to intuit the presence of radical tendencies, rather 
than to report profiled behaviours.  
Indeed, if Prevent were still embedded in a statistical calculative rationality it would have 
been discarded as a failure. In 2016, 90% of NHS referrals to Channel were assessed by the 
Police as not related to terrorism or extremism. The referrals were instead reclassified as 
requiring other types of safeguarding intervention (housing, drug and alcohol 
rehabilitation). As such the training given to teachers, doctors and nurses is not producing 
referrals that are taken seriously by police,  and yet, the roll out of Prevent to all social 
workers continues unabated. It is not considered politically or statistically problematic that 
the misfire rate of Prevent surveillance in the NHS is 90%. 
How can such high numbers of inappropriate referrals be tolerated without necessitating a 
change in the Prevent Duty? These features can only be treated as unimportant if statistical 
modelling no longer informs Prevent’s epistemology. The national rollout of Prevent and the 
ambivalence towards the 90% misfire rate betrays the presence of a non-statistical 
epistemology. In big data epistemologies, no data is wasted. Big data analytics privilege 
large sample sizes because they are understood to reveal patterns of correlation, invisible to 
the naked eye, from the digital evaluation of unrelated data scraps (Comfort et al. 2010). 
The processing of both appropriate and inappropriate referrals by local authority panels is, 
in this paradigm, helpful in the inductive generation of terrorism related patterns and 
profiles. 
It is this epistemological paradigm which informs the merging of the primary (population 
level) and secondary (high risk groups) categories of pre-crime intervention. The national 
geographical rollout of Prevent, which has replaced most implementation in residential 
communities, involves the radical remodelling of British pre-crime around big data 
epistemology. A probabilistic model could not recommend the application of secondary 
measures to the entire population, because probability science is used to isolate particular 
locations/communities as high-risk. The geographical shift in Prevent administration is also 
epistemological: it has moved away from renderings of ‘likelihood’, favouring the 
nationalised rollout of Prevent training, surveillance and reporting to all corners of the social 
care system. The imagination of pre-criminal space is now totalising and all encompassing. 
 
The Biopolitics of the Prevent Duty 
In 2008, Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero published an article exploring contemporary 
biopolitical security, specifically how security apparatuses have adapted to the molecular 
age by taking life-itself (rather than species life) as an object to be secured (Dillon & Lobo-
Guerrero 2008). They introduced modifications to Foucault’s conceptions of biopolitics and 
security, adapting them to twentieth century understandings of life and biology. The 
administration and regulation of life through structures of governance addresses population 
differently than it once did, moving away from the securitisation of behaviours and 
economic potentials to imagine insecurity through the contingency of the molecular level 
(2008, 278). Like much of the literature already explored in this article, Dillon and Lobo-
Guerrero show how Foucault’s biopolitics frames the shift from statistical, economic 
modelling of stable risks to the objectification of contingency as threat (2008, 283-4). Life 
rendered by medicine and science as pluripotent, they show, provoked a shift in the 
operations of security such that it now attempts to regulate and bound life’s generative 
capacity. 
This problematisation and securitisation of life-itself is evident in the development of the 
Prevent Strategy. Counterterrorism has adapted to reconfigured understandings of life and 
population, moving away from static models of insurgency and rushing to develop to new 
discourses of radicalisation in the aftermath of the London bombings that could help them 
to regulate contingency (Kundnani 2015; Sedgwick 2010). That there was felt to be a need 
for a new counterterrorism discourse to respond to the events is indicative of security’s 
biopolitical shift towards managing contingency in the twenty-first century. The 
problematisation of the London bombings, and the 9/11 attacks, as ushering in an era of 
unpredictability and uncertainty (Rumsfeld 2002) – rather than something that could be 
understood through studying militant groups and their turn towards attacking the ‘far 
enemy’ (Gerges 2005) – reflects a concern with the contingency and unpredictability of life.  
The reorientation of counterterrorism towards regulating contingency and life (where life is 
understood as adaptive potential, rather than as species life) is demonstrated most clearly 
in the re-articulation of counter-radicalisation as safeguarding. Safeguarding procedures are 
established protocols within social care and health care which make practitioners 
responsible for noticing, and reporting, physical, sexual and financial abuse of vulnerable 
people (Home Office 2015b; NHS England 2015). The remaking of Prevent as a safeguarding 
measure implicitly creates a new type of abuse: ideological abuse (Heath-Kelly 2016). At this 
point, the structures of care and security become blurred beyond distinction – revealing 
their common biopolitical heritage as structures productive and governing of population 
(Howell 2014). 
Under the Conservative governments, pre-criminal space has been reimagined as a 
totalising geography. The radical contingency of each life is interpreted as uniquely 
dangerous, requiring of a population-wide system of monitoring for unauthorised 
adaptations. I have referred to this elsewhere (Heath-Kelly 2016) as the autoimmune 
moment in British security policy where the distinction between suspicious and non-
suspicious bodies has collapsed; in the absence of traditional immunological security 
politics, the surveillance of all life, in totality, is now understood as biopolitically necessary 
and advantageous.  
It would befit the future of the Critical Terrorism Studies project to study the intertwining of 
social care structures with counterterrorism, as well as the blurring of digital and non-digital 
epistemologies of surveillance and calculation. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has explored the shifting geography and epistemology of the Prevent strategy 
from 2007 until 2017. It has highlighted the de-emphasising of residential communities as 
sites of intervention during the Coalition and Conservative periods, arguing that this reveals 
the shift from calculative rationalities of probability towards big data logics of inductive 
profiling. 
In Labour’s Prevent Strategy, the tripartite typology of primary, secondary and tertiary crime 
prevention measures informed the delivery of counter-radicalisation. Local authorities 
became important players in the deployment of Prevent’s secondary level measures 
intended to build ‘resilience’ to extremism in ‘vulnerable’ communities. But rather than 
statistically modelling those communities ‘most probable’ to produce terrorists from 
available data (a task for which probabilistic science is currently incapable (Sageman 2016)), 
Labour governments operationalised race as the foundation for their imagination of pre-
criminal space. Discourses of radicalisation re-signified British Asian communities as areas of 
higher extremism risk, and those communities were then targeted with crime prevention 
measures. 
After the change in government, the Prevent review severed the DCLG from Prevent 
strategy operations and criticised Labour’s blurring of integration and counter-terrorism. 
This criticism of Prevent’s secondary level of intervention did not end community profiling 
entirely, however. Some targeted local authorities still deliver some Central Government 
produced workshops and events, even though the deployment of Prevent through 
communities is reduced. Instead, the Prevent Duty has now radically altered the geography 
of counter-radicalisation. Prevent is now nationally deployed across the educational and 
healthcare sectors. This geographical shift embodies the merging of the primary and 
secondary levels of prevention: whole-of-population measures have been merged with 
those identifying more vulnerable groups. The two levels of intervention have merged. 
This epidemiological revolution betrays a shift in the epistemology of Prevent. The massive 
rollout of Prevent training to all NHS and educational staff does not respond to a 
population-wide insurgency, nor the likelihood that schools and hospitals are being used as 
bases for conspiracy. Rather, the educational and healthcare sectors have been 
incorporated into terrorism because they have significant access to the public. Home Office 
documentation lauds the prolific patient contacts experienced by the NHS, arguing that this 
makes it a valid partner in counter-terrorism. 
The value accorded to scale betrays a move away from probabilistic science. Algorithmic and 
big data logics have become prominent within digital surveillance, and employ huge 
datasets in their modalities. The calculative discourse associated with the big data paradigm 
(more data leads to the identification of previously hidden patterns and detections) appears 
to have influenced the geographic shift in Prevent’s deployment (in addition to the 
economic austerity drive of the Conservative and Coalition governments). Otherwise, the 
geographical shift to nationalised Prevent surveillance in all social care facilities would make 
little sense. Furthermore, the huge rejection rates of Channel referrals by the police would 
not be tolerated under a probabilistic paradigm.  
To conclude, the British government seems to be arriving at the conclusion (qua Marc 
Sageman) that terrorism cannot be statistically predicted in the style of other crimes. 
Instead, the fluctuations of the Prevent strategy under varying British governments provide 
a window onto the biopolitical constitution of pre-criminal geographies, where the 
contingency of life itself demands regulation, management and intervention. The 
imagination of pre-criminal space has extended outwards, in a dramatic colonisation of 
social care by counterterrorism.  
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